On August 29, 2023, Huawei quietly launched its new smartphone, the Huawei Mate 60 Pro, on its official website without the usual fanfare associated with new product releases. Unlike previous events or those held by other brands, Huawei chose to communicate with consumers solely through a letter. What intrigued the market most was the specification of the new device’s System-on-Chip (SoC). Initially, Huawei did not provide any official information about it. However, the release of this new smartphone demonstrates China’s determination to achieve semiconductor self-sufficiency.

Key Insights from TrendForce:

• Overcoming U.S. Sanctions, Huawei Makes a Comeback

In the past, Huawei secured its position as the second-largest player in the global smartphone market by leveraging the differentiating advantage of its in-house developed Kirin SoC chips. However, since May 2019, Huawei has been affected by U.S. sanctions. In September 2020, TSMC, which previously manufactured chips for Huawei, announced the cessation of production. With no supply from TSMC, Huawei’s inventory of 5G chips was depleted by the third quarter of 2022.

Unable to acquire high-end chips, Huawei’s market share in the smartphone industry saw a significant decline. The company could only source 4G chips not subject to U.S. sanctions from Qualcomm or UNISOC. It was believed that U.S. sanctions would severely impact Huawei’s smartphone supply chain and push the company into a dire situation. However, upon analyzing Huawei’s latest release, it is evident that the new smartphone not only features an in-house developed SoC chip by Huawei’s semiconductor subsidiary HiSilicon but also incorporates components and designs from various Chinese manufacturers.

• China’s Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency Continues to Strengthen, Minimal Impact on Taiwanese Supply Chain Expected

China’s pursuit of semiconductor self-sufficiency has become an inevitable outcome of industry development. Although Huawei has not provided detailed specifications for the SoC chip in the Mate 60 Pro, it is speculated that this chip likely uses SMIC’s N+2 process. Due to sanctions, SMIC has been unable to obtain essential EUV equipment. Furthermore, based on the chip’s performance benchmarking, it is comparable to Qualcomm’s flagship Snapdragon 888 chip released in 2021. This suggests that the SoC’s process technology likely falls in the range of 7-14nm, which still lags behind current advanced processes. Nevertheless, this achievement underscores China’s commitment to semiconductor self-sufficiency.

As China gains the ability to independently develop and produce chips, the question arises of whether other Chinese smartphone brands, apart from Huawei, will begin their own chip development efforts. Will this development impact Taiwanese IC design house and foundries that previously held related orders? MediaTek, for instance, primarily supplies chips to brands such as OPPO and vivo. Given that Huawei competes strongly with OPPO and vivo in the smartphone market, it is unlikely that these two brands will entrust their smartphone core SoCs to Huawei’s HiSilicon. Additionally, developing proprietary chips comes with significant costs. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is expected that OPPO and vivo will maintain their partnerships with MediaTek. MediaTek’s chip designs can also utilize TSMC’s advanced processes, giving OPPO and vivo a key competitive advantage against Huawei. Consequently, it is inferred that as long as there is a significant gap between the processes and yields of SMIC and TSMC, Taiwanese foundries will not be significantly affected.

(Photo credit: Huawei)

According to Taiwan’s TechNews report, Chiang Shang-yi, former TSMC Co-COO and current Chief Semiconductor Strategist at Foxconn, shared insights during a Taiwan Television interview. He discussed his past role at TSMC, the potential impact of U.S. export restrictions on China’s semiconductor development, and revealed previously undisclosed stories. Chiang emphasized the need to reevaluate China’s approach to semiconductor manufacturing.

Chiang previously stated that he wouldn’t return to China, and when asked about geopolitical challenges in the region due to U.S. chip restrictions, he shared his experiences in China.

He mentioned that his initial focus was primarily on research and development, and while technical challenges were manageable, the most significant challenge was related to human interactions. Chiang also disclosed two instances where he experienced a lack of trust from Chinese authorities.

He explained that the headquarters of SMIC is in Shanghai, with its largest facility located in Beijing. On two separate occasions, senior executives were scheduled to visit the Beijing facility, and Chiang was instructed to participate. However, he was informed just a day prior that he, as a non-Chinese national, would not be allowed to attend these visits. Similar incidents occurred twice, leaving him with a rather uncomfortable impression.

Regarding the U.S. chip ban, Chiang acknowledged that China had invested heavily in semiconductors over the past decade, and the recent restrictions were a more recent development. However, he emphasized that even before the restrictions, China’s semiconductor industry faced challenges and that the way China pursued semiconductor development needed reevaluation.

On the other hand, Chiang discussed why TSMC has been successful, attributing it to its business model and rapid decision-making. He mentioned a proposal he made to establish a packaging unit within TSMC to address the bottleneck created by the end of Moore’s Law. This proposal, referred to as “Advanced Packaging,” was quickly approved by TSMC’s founder, Morris Chang, who provided the resources to make it happen. This initiative led to the development of CoWoS (Chip-on-Wafer-on-Substrate) technology.

However, despite the innovation, CoWoS initially faced challenges gaining business traction and was even considered a joke within the company. Chiang had to work hard to promote the technology to customers. During a dinner with a Qualcomm executive, Chiang learned that CoWoS’s price was too high for consideration, with the executive requiring a price reduction to one cent per minimeter square. Chiang returned to TSMC and urged R&D to lower costs while maintaining performance, eventually leading to the success of InFO (Integrated Fan-Out) technology.

Chiang mentioned that the first customer to embrace CoWoS technology was Huawei, primarily for GPU chips, well before AI applications gained prominence. He humorously credited the Qualcomm executive for saving him with a single sentence and emphasized that innovation needed to be practical, not just technological, to succeed in the industry.

According to a report from Taiwan’s TechNews, Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro smartphone, powered by its in-house Kirin 9000S processor, quietly appeared on the market recently, testing has shown that its network speed approaches that of 5G. This development has sparked enthusiastic discussions in the market about the manufacturing and development of this chip.

Prominent analyst Andrew Lu also expressed that if the semiconductor manufacturer, SMIC, which handles the production of the Kirin 9000S processor, makes significant breakthroughs in both 7nm process technology and capacity, it should not be underestimated. Additionally, with Huawei’s reintroduction of the Kirin 9000S processor through the Mate 60 Pro, they are expected to continue launching products that are likely to have an impact on the mobile phone and mobile chip market.

Andrew Lu outlined the following points on his personal Facebook fan page:

1. The Kirin 9000S processor is likely manufactured by SMIC using N+2 process technology, with N+1 being a pseudo-7nm process that is closer to 8-9nm. N+2 is a 7nm process (not the rumored 5nm), but it does not use EUV, so multiple exposures are needed. Due to insufficient capacity, shipping 40 million units would likely take several months. Assuming a die size of 169mm² and an 80% yield rate, SMIC would need to prepare 144k N+2 capacity, this indicates a monthly production capacity requirement of 24,000 units. The monthly production capacity appears significantly higher than what was previously anticipated. If these assumptions hold, it indicates that SMIC has made significant breakthroughs in 7nm process technology and capacity.
2. Apple’s iPhone doesn’t emphasize Antutu benchmark scores as much, and Android phones typically fine-tune their systems for benchmarking, making comparisons between iOS and Android phones less fair. However, compared to other Android flagship phones scoring around 1.5-1.6 million, the Mate 60’s 1.1 million still falls short, but it excels in satellite phone functionality.
3. Huawei/Huawei’s HiSilicon’s return is likely to continue with the release of new devices, aiming to reach annual sales of 100 million phones within 5 years, which should not be difficult. This means Huawei/Huawei’s HiSilicon will regain approximately 5-10% of the global market share, while other phone and chip manufacturers will lose 5-10% of their market share with flagship brands likely being more affected.
4. Despite the U.S. putting SMIC on the Entity List, how does SMIC still have so much advanced process capacity? Lu Xingzhi believes that being placed on the Entity List doesn’t entirely prohibit companies from purchasing all advanced U.S. equipment (EUV scanners are absolutely prohibited), but it requires approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce to purchase such equipment. Additionally, the rapid emergence of many semiconductor startups in China (some of which disappear shortly after) makes it challenging for U.S. equipment manufacturers and the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine if the purchased equipment is being resold to SMIC. Therefore, SMIC’s expansion of advanced process capacity is not surprising. According to Lu’s data, SMIC’s capital intensity, capital expenditure as a percentage of revenue, was 110% over the past year, significantly higher than TSMC’s 50% and Samsung LSI’s and GlobalFoundries’ 40% range, indicating that capacity expansion is likely to be considerably higher than peers in the industry.

(Photo credit: Huawei)

According to a report by Taiwan’s TechNews, the Huawei Kirin 9000S mobile processor, dubbed by Chinese media as “4G technology with 5G speed,” was incorporated into the Huawei Mate 60 Pro smartphone on the 29th. The phone was made available for purchase directly without a launch event or prior promotion, priced at 6,999 Chinese Yuan, sparking significant industry discussion.

The discussion around the Huawei Kirin 9000S mobile processor stems from the fact that, for the first time post the US-China trade war, a chip foundry has manufactured chips for Huawei, featuring an advanced 5-nanometer process. Does this signify a breakthrough for Chinese chip production amidst US restrictions and a leap forward in China’s semiconductor industry? At present, the answer seems to be negative.

According to insiders’ revelations, the Mate 60 Pro’s Kirin 9000S chip was manufactured by SMIC. However, key production aspects are still under US control, making breaking through these limitations quite challenging.

Screenshots shared by users indicate that Kirin is on a 5nm process. Nonetheless, technical experts widely believe that the 9000S isn’t on a 5nm process; rather, it’s on SMIC’s N+2 process.

Source: fin

SMIC is the only Chinese enterprise capable of mass-producing 14-nanometer FinFET technology. Both N+1 and N+2 processes are improvements based on the 14nm FinFET technology and are achieved through DUV lithography, bypassing US restrictions. (The most advanced processes currently require EUV lithography machines.)

SMIC has not openly stated that N+1 and N+2 are on the 7nm process. However, the chip industry generally considers N+1 to be equivalent to 7nm LPE (Low Power) technology, and N+2 to be equivalent to 7nm LPP (High Performance) technology. The shipment of the Mate 60 Pro seems to have openly revealed information about SMIC’s N+2 process reaching maturity and entering mass production.

(Photo credit: Huawei)

The risks associated with the United States’ suppression of China’s semiconductor industry and the ongoing tension in China-US relations continue to permeate the supply chain. However, most customers of foundries are adopting a cautious approach, either maintaining a wait-and-see attitude or gradually introducing second sources to mitigate risks.

The operational conditions and challenges faced by China’s two major foundries, SMIC and HuaHong, differ to some extent. In the case of SMIC, despite being added to the U.S. Entity List as early as 2020, most of its customers continue to place orders with SMIC due to concerns about the time-consuming and costly nature of verification.

According to a survey by TrendForce, only one U.S.-based brand is actively pursuing a decoupling strategy in response to U.S. government bids, while other brands are mostly conducting risk assessments of their supply chains without fully implementing a complete decoupling strategy.

In particular, SMIC still maintains a competitive edge in terms of lower prices and the advantage of the domestic Chinese market, which keeps most of its customers placing orders and prevents a significant drop in overall capacity utilization rate compared to other foundries. Its utilization rate in 1Q23 was approximately 65-70%, and it is expected to slightly increase to nearly 70% in 2Q23.

HuaHong, on the other hand, is taking a cautious approach to address the risks arising from the China-US tension. HuaHong’s subsidiary, ICRD, primarily focuses on process technology R&D, with a particular emphasis on the 28/14nm process nodes.

It is currently setting up a specialized 28nm production line, which uses photolithography equipment from two major international manufacturers, ASML and Nikon. For all other equipment, Chinese domestically manufactured machines are being used as substitutes.

The planned total production capacity for this production line is 40Kwspm ( wafer starts per month). Considering the possibility of both Japan and the Netherlands potentially joining trade sanctions later this year, the future expansion plans for HuaHong’s production capacity are uncertain.

(Photo Credit: SMIC)